Derechos subjetivos y sistema en la primera modernidad

Abstract

The claim to structure laws from a single prin­ciple -that is, a system- finds one of its sources in the methodological speculation of a movement in XVI-century juridical human­ism. Its advocates attempted to expose the ius commune in a methodical fashion, which assumed the establishment of fundamental principles or notions from which the most particular contents should be derived. It was no chance that those who succeeded in that task the most were the jurists who, as Hughes Doneau, made use of the notion of law un­derstood as faculty.  Instead, if law is under­stood as the just regulation of the concrete problem, the way Thomas Aquinas and other humanist jurists such as François Connan or Pierre de la Grégoire thought, the diversity inherent in wontedness hampers the system. But authors like Doneau even established varied causes for the different faculties and, therefore, their systems were not fully rigor­ous. Their advances, however, were completed by modern iusnaturalism representatives, who built a whole system based on subjective law of an individualistic origin.